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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CLYDE GILBERT TATE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

JOHN \\T. TURNER.WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case N"o.
12706

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal by Clyde Gilbert Tate from a deci<>ion of the Third Judicial District Court denying his
release from the Utah State Prison upon a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.
OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
On July 7, 1971 the appellant filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District Court. A subsequent petition
(R. 24-27) was apparently sent to the court on August
28, 1971. The matter was heard before the Honorable
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Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., on October 7, 1971 and the
petition was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
order of the District Court and an order from this court
directing that appellant be granted a writ of habeas
corpus and released from the custody of John W.
Turner, 'Varden of the Utah State Prison. In the alternative, appellant asks that this court remand this
case to the District Court with directions to hold a more
extensive hearing on the issue of the adequacy of the
investigation and preparation of appellant's trial counsel.
STATEl\:IENT OF' FACTS
Appellant was arrested on a charge of forgery and
has been incarcerated and impecunious since the time of
this arrest. The counsel which was appointed originally
to represent appellant on this charge withdrew about
two weeks after appellant was first brought before a
magistrate. This withdrawal was apparently based on a
conflict of interest. (R. 70) Mr. Luke G. Pappas was
subsequently appointed to represent appellant.
Appellant was charged with forging a check on
the account of a Mr. Redd. Appellant's basic defense
was that he and :Mr. Redd had been on a drinking
spree, Mr. Redd's check would not be accepted because
they were not legible, and Mr. Redd had therefore
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authorized appellant to sign his check. ( R. 77, 84, 86;
and page 12 of the transcript of appellant's sentencing
in the District Court of Grand County.) Appellant
hoped to establish this authorization through testimony
of bar-tenders and barmaids. (R. 83, 84, 86) Mr. Pappas acknowledged these witnesses are being critical to
appellant's defense. (R. 87) Since appellant could not
provide the names of these witnesses, Mr. Pappas' search
for these witnesses was limited to a single inquiry at one
establishment which appellant and Mr. Redd had allegedly hit during their drinking spree. (R. 91)
The transcript of appellant's sentencing in the District Court of Grand County shows that appellant has
an alcoholic problem, but the transcript of appellant's
habeas corpus hearing indicates that l\fr. Pappas did not
investigate the possibility of a defense based on intoxication or alcoholism.
ARGUl\fENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELO\V ERRED IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT 'VAS REPRESENTED
BY EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
The time prior to the date set for trial is perhaps
the most critical period of a criminal proceeding, and a
defendant does not have the aid of counsel in any real
:\ense if his appointed counsel does not utilize this time
for a thorough-going investigation. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 4.5, 57 (1932).
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Even the most skeletal preparation of appellant's
defense called for a thorough search for the bartenders
and barmaids which appellant wanted to use to establish
his authorization to sign the check ·which he was accused
of forging. Effective preparation of appellant's defense also called for an investigation of possible defenses
based on intoxication and his alcoholism. If appellant
was intoxicated at the time he wrote the check he may
not have had the specific intent to commit forgery. If
his writing of the check was an uncontrolable symptom
of his alcoholism, he may have been exculpated from
criminal liability by reason of an insanity defense or a
defense based on the cruel and unusual punishment pro·
vision of the 8th Amendment to the United States Con·
stitution.
Under the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution and statutes of Utah, appellant has a
right to such investigation and preparation.
In Brooks v. 'l'e.rrzs, 381 F .2d 619 (5th Cir., 1967),
a writ of habeas corpus was granted on the grounds, in·
ter alia, that the defendant's appointed counsel did ade·
quately investigate a possible defense of insanity. In
Owsley v. Pe.7Jton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir., 1966), it is
held that a defendant in denied efefctive assistance of
counsel where a state statute entitles a defen<lant to a
preliminary inquiry as to his competency to stand trial
and the defendant's attorney fails to adduce available
proof of defendant's mental condition. And, in Goodu:in
v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (\V.D.:Mo., 1968) it is
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held that a petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus where defense counsel's failure to investigate resulted in concealment of a medical diagnosis of psychosis
on the day defendant gave an incriminating statement
to the police. The thrust of these cases is that defense
counsel is prima facia ineffective where a defendant has
possible mitigating or exculpating mental conditions,
and these conditions are not investigated.
In Twiford v. Pe,yton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir.,
1967), the petitioner was granted a writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that he had been denied effective
assistance of counsel in a state criminal proceeding. An
attorney was appointed to represent the petitioner on
the day before trial and the appointed counsel interviewed the petitioner and did some investigation. At the
time set for trial the petitioner informed his counsel
that there was a witness who could testify that the defendant was not in the county at the time of the alleged
crime. Petitioner's counsel moved for a continuance, but
the motion was denied because he did not have sufficient
facts to represent to the court that the witness was material and could be found.
The United States Court of Appeals found the
petitioner had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel and directed the issuance of the writ. This decision was based primarily on the appointment of counsel
one day before the trial and the resulting lack of time
for counsel to produce the alibi witness. There is, howeYer, no logical distinction between ineffectiveness of
counsel based on lack of time to investigate and ineffec-
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tiveness which results by reason of failure to make a
more thorough investigation than was made in the instant case.
The decision in T"l.mf ord is also applicable to the
instant case in another regard. The court in Twiford
reasoned that lack of preparation by counsel is so in·
herently prejudicial as to constitute "a prima facie case
of denial of effective assistance of counsel, so that the
burden of proving lack of prejudice is shifted to the
state." 372 F.2d at 673.
The record in the instant case discloses that appel·
lant's appointed counsel made only a cursory search for
possible defense witnesses. Under these facts, as in Tu:i·
ford, it was for the State of Utah, and not the appellant,
to either produce the witnesses sought by appellant or
to show that a thorough search had been made for said
witnesses and they could not be found.
In Fortner v. Balkcom, 380 F.2d 816 (5th Cir ..
1967), the court held that allegations of ineffective rep·
resentation based on failure to call critical witnesses
must be thoroughly examined and made the subject of
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in a
habeas corpus hearing. The court held that the judge
in such a habeas corpus hearing must make specific
findings as to the actual activities of the petitioner's attorney, and the matter must be remanded for further
hearing where no such specific findings are made.
If this court does not find that the record discloses
the appellant was denied the effective assistance of
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counsel, then this court should remand this case to the
court below for a more complete hearing on the extent
of the search made by .Mr. Pappas for critical witnesses
and an investigation of appellant's qualifications for a
defense based on intoxication or alcoholism.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT ENTERED HIS GUILTY PLEA
VOJ_.UNTARILY.
As argued in Point I, appellant's counsel failed to
prepare or investigate any substantial defense which
might have been available to appellant. Such a failure
or preparation has an obvious coercive effect on forcing
a defendant to choose a guilty plea to a lesser offense
as opposed to going to trial without any preparation in
defense of the original charge. In this context the appellant's plea was not voluntary.
Evidence of coercion is also found in appellant's
testimony that threats were made to bring additional
charges if appellant fought the charge against him (R.
745, 75) , and he was denied proper medical care during
his pre-trial incarceration. ( R. 76)

CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction is invalid because he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel by reason of
the fact his appointed counsel failed to adequately in-
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vestigate the whereabouts of critica] witnesses and pur
sue possible defenses based on appellant's intoxicatior
and alcoholism.
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The delay between the time when appellant was
arrested and the time when Mr. Pappas first intervie\\'trl
appellant was prejudicial because it reduced the possi·
bility of success for the cursory search which Mr. Pappa1
made for appellant's witnesses.
Appellant's guilty plea was made in the context of
the failure of his appointed counsel to pursue appel·
!ant's only significant defenses. Under these circum·
stances the plea cannot be considered voluntary because
it is the direct result of the ineffectiveness of appellant's
appointed counsel.
This Court should reverse the judgment and order
of the lower court and remand this case with directions
to grant appellant a writ of habeas corpus. In the alter·
native, this case should be remanded with directions to
hold a more extensive hearing on the extent of appel·
lant's counsel's search for witnesses and his failure to
pursue defenses based on mental incapacity.
Respectively submitted,
RAYMOND S. SHUEY
231 East Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

